“MacArthur’s Eyes‪”‬

As American military historians ponder the impacts of military intelligence operations on the conduct and outcome of the nation’s wars, a key question comes to mind: how can we most objectively assess America’s performance of military intelligence operations? In answering this question we must understand the complexity of military intelligence work, for it traverses that gray area where militarystrategy and foreign policy intertwine. Oftentimes, when policymakers and military leaders fail to synchronize American foreign policy objectives and military strategy, the intelligence community, which forms a bridge between the political and military realms, makes a convenient scapegoat for such policy failures. Conversely, intelligence successes most often remain highly classified to protect the collection capabilities that facilitated a corresponding operational success. Much better known for its failures than its successes, military intelligence is widely regarded as the quintessential oxymoron.Yet, worse contradictions in terms have affected the American conduct of war. For example, in the Korean War the American principle of “do more with less.” proved true for all parts of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East, including their military intelligence organizations. In the midst of a post World War II force reduction, military intelligence, performed the best that it could within prescribed geopolitical and military constraints. Moreover, the war catalyzed the chaotic reorganization of the U.S. national security structure, which had tremendous impact on military intelligence operations in Korea.It is in this context that we must reassess American military intelligence operations in the Korean War. For over a half-century, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2), Major General Charles A. Willoughby, have borne the brunt of blame for the “intelligence failures” of June 25th and November 25th, 1950. All too often historians oversimplify these failures by ignoring important distinctions between discerning enemy capabilities and order of battle and the infinitely harder task of discerning enemy intentions. In reassessing military intelligence operations in the Korean War, one finds that “intelligence failures” were actually military command and political policy failures that became mutually reinforcing while intelligence successes reflected the converse. Therefore, MacArthur and Willoughby should not bear their historical burden alone, and they should receive due credit for many of the intelligence successes of the war. Take a look back atmilitary intelligence operations in the Korean War through “MacArthur’s eyes” and judge for yourself.