Reflections on Research and Development in the United States Air Force: An interview with Generals Bernard Schriever, Samuel Phillips, Robert Marsh, and James Doolittle, and Dr. Ivan Getting

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this Air Force publication explores the research, development and acquisition (RDA) process in the United States Air Force. In particular, the discussion among the participants sought to elicit how that process evolved, whether or not it had been successful, why it changed, and what have been the major influences upon it. Readers will note that the discussion proceeds chronologically and topically from the "Early Days" through the post-World War II era to the 1970s and 1980s.

In the early days, pilots did not fully appreciate the value of research and development. Few had received any technical training and for the most part they cared only about the final product. Competitive air races first brought aviation to public attention and simultaneously fostered new aeronautical research and development. While this science advanced rapidly, the Army's air arm lagged behind American commercial aviation, as well as European commercial and military aviation. Through the early 1930s the Army Air Corps focused on the observation mission while its pilots still flew open cockpit biplanes.

The crux of the problem was that while the three major elements of military aviation, the Army Air Corps, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and the aviation industry cooperated with one another, no overall coordinating agency existed. Moreover, with funding for aviation extremely limited, each of the three elements concentrated on its own interests.

The major turning point in the evolution of the RDA process was the Army's air mail experience. In the winter of 1934 President Franklin D. Roosevelt was embroiled in a dispute with the airlines involving fraud and collusion in government contracts. Consequently, he directed the Army Air Corps to substitute for commercial air mail carriers. This episode proved a sobering experience as Air Corps pilots and planes were unprepared for the mission on account of their inability to fly in bad weather and over unfamiliar terrain. As Air Corps losses mounted steadily, public criticism obliged the government to commission a formal investigation. Subsequently, Newton D. Baker, the former Secretary of War, headed a board which recommended modernizing the air arm. Fortuitously, the Baker Board also addressed numerous deficiencies, and resolution of these was vital for conducting aerial warfare. By 1939 the Air Corps had embarked on an ambitious research and development (R&D) program and was flying practically every airplane which would be used during World War II.