Awakening Victory
How Iraqi Tribes and American Troops Reclaimed Al Anbar and Defeated Al Qaeda in Iraq
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- ¥1,600
発行者による作品情報
An "instructive first-hand account of how Iraq's insurgents were defeated" in the surge of 2007—written by a Combat Arms Battalion Commander who lived it (Publishers Weekly).
In August 2006, the American war in Iraq was looking grim. Control of Al Anbar Province, the seat of the Sunni insurgency, was said to be irrevocably lost to the insurgents. Al Qaeda in Iraq had planted their flag in the provincial capital, Ramadi, declaring it the capital of their new "Islamic State of Iraq."
In January 2007, the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armored Regiment, deployed to Ramadi, spearheading a surge that would become the D-Day of the Global War on Terror. By mid-summer 2007, attacks in the province were down ninety percent. As the "awakening" swept through Iraq, it brought about the best security situation since 2003. The 3rd Battalion was the only unit to participate in this campaign from start to finish. Moreover, many of the US successes came directly from this unit's work.
Awakening Victory tells the story of this incredible campaign through the eyes of the 3rd Battalion commander. It describes the battalion's actions, including incidents previously unknown to the public, but it is not merely another war story. The author uses the actions of his battalion to describe a paradigm shift, moving from a war of bombs and bullets to one of partnership and ideas.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
In this instructive first-hand account of how Iraq's insurgents were defeated, Silverman recounts the operations of his unit in Anbar Province's city of Ramadi. A veteran of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, Silverman deployed to Iraq for a third time in 2006 as the commander of a combat arms battalion assigned to the 1st Brigade Combat Team. When he arrived, Anbar province was viewed as "the most violent and dangerous place in Iraq", and the seat of the ongoing Sunni insurgency. The mission was to use modern counter-insurgency methods to separate Iraqi nationalists from Al-Qaeda terrorists, while winning the support of the population and its tribal and clan-based "sheikh" system. As the terrorists were separated from support, they were forced to abandon safe havens and retreat to more deserted areas where they were destroyed. This controversial strategy was opposed by those who simply distrusted or hated all Iraqis, and who were reluctant or refused to work with them, as well as those who feared the emergence of Sunni militias. Silverman is critical of the assassinations of enemies and their effect on the population.
