Before the Quagmire
American Intervention in Laos, 1954–1961
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- ¥1,600
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- ¥1,600
発行者による作品情報
This critical study of US intervention in the Laotian Civil War is "a major contribution to the literature on America's Southeast Asian involvement" (Publishers Weekly).
In the decade preceding the first US combat operations in Vietnam, the Eisenhower administration sought to defeat a communist-led insurgency in neighboring Laos. Although US foreign policy in the 1950s focused primarily on threats posed by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the American engagement in Laos evolved from a small cold war skirmish into a superpower confrontation near the end of President Eisenhower's second term. Ultimately, the American experience in Laos foreshadowed many of the mistakes made by the United States in Vietnam in the 1960s.
In Before the Quagmire, historian William J. Rust examines key policy decisions made in Washington and how they were implementation on the ground in Laos, setting the US on a path to wider war in Southeast Asia. Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, Before the Quagmire documents how ineffective assistance to Laotian anticommunist elites reflected fundamental misunderstandings about the country's politics, history, and culture.
A Choice Outstanding Academic Title
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Journalist and historian Rust (Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 1960 1963) makes a major contribution to the literature on America's Southeast Asian involvement with this comprehensively researched, well-written study of a usually overlooked aspect. Dwight Eisenhower's presidential reputation rests in good part on his management of foreign policy crises. Rust makes a convincing case for Laos as a glaring exception. As early as 1954 Eisenhower's administration was seeking to counter a Communist insurgency in that newly independent state. The result was " case study in transforming a small foreign-policy problem into a large one." Recognizing its taproots in cold war anxiety and groupthink, Rust describes a pattern of intervention in Laotian politics that only destabilized noncommunist elements. The CIA, State Department, and military held differing opinions and worked at cross purposes. Seeking a quick solution, the U.S. overemphasized military assistance. It supported would-be leaders more concerned with gaining power than fighting insurgents. Eventually the U.S. wound up supporting both the government and a faction seeking to overthrow it. The Soviet Union, perceiving itself challenged, became directly and diplomatically engaged in the conflict. As Rust ably demonstrates, Laos prefigured Vietnam. 26 photos, 2 maps.
