Losing Iraq
Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco
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- ¥1,600
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- ¥1,600
発行者による作品情報
According to conventional wisdom, Iraq has suffered because the Bush administration had no plan for reconstruction. That's not the case; the State Department's Future of Iraq group planned out the situation carefully and extensively, and Middle East expert David Phillips was part of this group. White House ideologues and imprudent Pentagon officials decided simply to ignore those plans. The administration only listened to what it wanted to hear. Losing Iraq doesn't't just criticize the policies of unilateralism, preemption, and possible deception that launched the war; it documents the process of returning sovereignty to an occupied Iraq. Unique, as well, are Phillips's personal accounts of dissension within the administration. The problems encountered in Iraq are troubling not only in themselves but also because they bode ill for other nation-building efforts in which the U.S. may become mired through this administration's doctrine of unilateral, preemptive war. Losing Iraq looks into the future of America's foreign policy with a clear-eyed critique of the problems that loom ahead.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
In an ambitious attempt to render bureaucracy dramatic, Phillips, a defecting former senior policy adviser to President Bush, sets out to describe the policy meetings, memos and internal government negotiations behind the Iraq war, and to contrast what he sees as the reality of the occupation with the stated policies of the government. During the runup to the war, Phillips nurtured an authentically diverse coalition of Iraqis and international officials to plan Iraq's economic and political reconstruction. In a text whose main character is a working group (even if it is, as its Iraqi members call it, "the Mother of All Working Groups"), Phillips documents the increasing rhetorical volume of Wolfowitz, Bremer, and Bush himself, while matter-of-factly describing what he sees as the disastrous effect of their policies on the U.S.'s effort to win the trust of Iraqis before the war. The Bush administration, he charges, not only ignored the expert advice of this group, but duplicated and undermined its efforts; Phillips found himself and his work marginalized. His account, unfortunately, is obscured by a fog of acronyms and names. What Phillips offers is more a paradigmatic account of one official group thwarted efforts than a critical analysis of large-scale shifts in power.
