Rumsfeld's War
The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander
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- ¥1,900
発行者による作品情報
Not since Robert McNamara has a secretary of defense been so hated by the military and derided by the public, yet played such a critical role in national security policy—with such disastrous results.
Donald Rumsfeld was a natural for secretary of defense, a position he'd already occupied once before. He was smart. He worked hard. He was skeptical of the status quo in military affairs and dedicated to high-tech innovations. He seemed the right man at the right time-but history was to prove otherwise.
Now Dale Herspring, a political conservative and lifelong Republican, offers a nonpartisan assessment of Rumsfeld's impact on the U.S. military establishment from 2001 to 2006, focusing especially on the Iraq War-from the decision to invade through the development and execution of operational strategy and the enormous failures associated with the postwar reconstruction of Iraq.
Extending the critique of civil-military relations he began in The Pentagon and the Presidency, Herspring highlights the relationship between the secretary and senior military leadership, showing how Rumsfeld and a handful of advisers—notably Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith—manipulated intelligence and often ignored the military in order to implement their policies. And he demonstrates that the secretary's domineering leadership style and trademark arrogance undermined his vision for both military transformation and Iraq.
Herspring shows that, contrary to his public deference to the generals, Rumsfeld dictated strategy and operations—sometimes even tactics—to prove his transformation theories. He signed off on abolishing the Iraqi army, famously refused to see the need for a counterinsurgency plan, and seemed more than willing to tolerate the torture of prisoners. Meanwhile, the military became demoralized and junior officers left in droves.
Rumsfeld's Wars revisits and reignites the concept of "arrogance of power," once associated with our dogged failure to understand the true nature of a tragic war in Southeast Asia. It provides further evidence that success in military affairs is hard to achieve without mutual respect between civilian authorities and military leaders—and offers a definitive case study in how not to run the office of secretary of defense.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
If there were an official Donald H. Rumsfeld Admiration Society, Scarborough would be a leading candidate for its president. The Washington Times Pentagon reporter has written a paean to the Secretary of Defense that all but paints a big"S" on his chest. To Scarborough's credit, though, he makes his opinion immediately clear:"History will surely judge Rumsfeld one of America's most important defense leaders," he writes in the introduction. Nevertheless, Scarborough casts a revealing eye on"Rummy's" campaign to make the Pentagon heel to his foreign policies. The book is full of juicy tidbits--most of them in the first two chapters--gleaned from classified documents. For instance, a full six months before asking the United Nations to endorse the use of force in Iraq, Scarborough writes, President Bush signed a secret National Security Directive establishing the goals and objectives for going to war with the country. Scarborough also relates how a top secret military unit code-named"Grey Fox" contributed to the assassination of Al Qaeda planner Qaed Senyan al Harthi by turning on his satellite phone without his knowledge and exposing his position in a convoy speeding across the Yemini desert. Other anecdotes serve to emphasize Rumsfeld's"preference for military, special forces solutions to law enforcement scenarios." A later chapter is devoted to his skills as a manager."In assessing Rumsfeld, cliches work," Scarborough writes."His life is an 'all-American story.' He does not 'suffer fools gladly.' And, Donald H. Rumfeld is 'the right man at the right time.'" Readers already convinced of Rumsfeld's talents as a leader will enjoy this enthusiastic book, but those looking for a balanced assessment of the Defense Secretary's job performance may prefer James Mann's level-headed study The Rise of the Vulcans.
