Summits
Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century
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- ¥2,400
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- ¥2,400
発行者による作品情報
The Cold War dominated history for nearly half a century, locking two superpowers in a global rivalry that ended only with the collapse of the Soviet Union. For millennia, the outcomes of war had been determined on the battlefield, but the most decisive moments of the Cold War occurred in the carefully worded exchanges of world leaders meeting face to face. In the shadow of the bomb, the summit meeting offered an opportunity for heads of state to rattle sabers and cross swords without triggering nuclear apocalypse. Drawing on extensive archival material, prizewinning historian David Reynolds describes the outsized personalities who negotiated the course of twentieth-century history: Neville Chamberlain, Adolph Hitler, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev, Richard Nixon, Leonid Brezhnev, Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Ronald Reagan. While these men addressed epochal issues, the outcome of each meeting was often determined more by individual personality than by international politics. Mishandled summits-Munich in 1938 and Yalta in 1945-brought about World War II and the Cold War, respectively. Kennedy's disastrous performance in Vienna in 1961 nearly brought about World War III. But successful summits in Moscow (1972), Camp David (1978), and Geneva (1985) led to dénte, a partial settlement in the Middle East, and a peaceful end to the Cold War. Written with verve and insight, Summits vividly describes the statesmen who stood, if only briefly, on top of the world. By revealing both the promise and the pitfalls of international diplomacy, David Reynolds offers valuable lessons as we find ourselves confronting once again a war without end.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
John F. Kennedy opined that nations in conflict would do better to "meet at the summit than at the brink." Reynolds had the intriguing idea of examining the conflicts of the 20th century through the lens of its pivotal summit meetings. Given his Cambridge professorship and eight books on WWII and the Cold War (Command of History), the author's thorough mastery of his subject is reflected in the fluency and assurance of the writing. As he explains, many summits have been vitiated by misplaced trust: at Munich in 1938, Chamberlain believed Hitler would keep his word on Czechoslovakia. In Reynolds's view, Kennedy and Khrushchev failed at Vienna in 1961 in nearly all respects, and their failure had consequences, including Khrushchev's belligerence and ultimate humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis. In 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev held what the author believes was the most successful summit of all, a result of careful preparation and the old-fashioned, behind-the-scenes diplomacy of George Shultz. The Camp David summit with Sadat, Carter and Begin, in this account, rivals Munich for sheer drama. The stories of these summits (plus the post-WWII Yalta conference and Nixon/Brezhnev in 1972) reveal the calculation, bluff, mutual incomprehension and good intentions that make meetings at the top risky and, occasionally, productive.
