The Jay Treaty Debate

In the spring of 1794 America appeared to be on the brink of war with England. Citizens claimed that the British government resisted opening its ports to American ships, interfered with neutral shipping rights to fight its war with France, and violated sections of the 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution.1 Amid clamors from Federalists and Republicans that ranged from negotiations, defense measures, and commercial non-intercourse, President Washington chose to nominate Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay as a special envoy to negotiate disputes between the two nations. Jay's "mission," announced Washington, demonstrated to the world America's "reluctance to hostility."2 The treaty that Jay returns to the Washington administration answered very little of the concerns he was sent to address, but did establish that the United States would not enter the fight between France and England.  The lack of concessions from the British government enraged the American populist and politicians alike, and put Washington in the difficult situation of deciding whether or not to ratify the treaty and, if signed, how to use his political leadership to earn the support of a divided Congress. This case study examines Washington’s presidential leadership as he skillfully maneuvers the numerous issues with the Jay Treaty while remaining committed to the overall strategy of his administration.