Darryl Lamar Standard v. United States

Order BEFORE: WEICK, MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges Upon consideration of petitioner-appellant's motion for the appointment of counsel and the response, reply and affidavit submitted in relation thereto, It appears from a careful review of the district court record that the petitioner did enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea of guilty, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Armstrong v. Egeler, 563 F.2d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1977), which comported with minimal due process requirements. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979). The fact that petitioner's sentence was actually greater than what was expected or predicted by counsel does not render the plea involuntary. Stout v. United States, 508 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1975); Villarreal v. United States, 508 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1974); Calabrese v. United States, 507 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1974). It is also apparent that a district court may rule on a motion to vacate sentence without waiting for a reply to be submitted by the petitioner to the government's response to motion. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Finally, it is noted that the Court has examined all of the other issues raised in the petitioner's appellate brief, and, finding them to be frivolous and not to have been initially presented to the district court, see Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 13318 1337 (6th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Havener, 534 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1976), it is apparent that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to vacate sentence. It is, accordingly, ORDERED that the motion for the appointment of counsel be and hereby is denied; and, it is also ORDERED that the District Court's judgment be and hereby is affirmed pursuant to Rule 9(d)3, Rules of the Sixth Circuit, because the issues upon which the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument.