R. S. and T. Children Under 17 Years Age

In this statutory proceeding under the Juvenile Act [Sections 211.011 to 211.431], the juvenile court on April 7, 1961, found and adJudged that three brothers, R , S and T (then of the age of 13 years 7 months, 11 years 8 months and 7 years 11 months, respectively), were within the applicable provisions of Section 211.031 (in that their mother was deceased and their father had ""failed and refused to support"" them and was ""not in a position to properly care for, supervise and control"" them), made them wards of the court, and committed them to the custody of the division of welfare to be placed in an approved home. Sections 211.181 and 210.120(1). (Except as is otherwise specifically stated, all statutory references are to RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.) The father seeks appellate review. A motion by the prosecuting attorney, director of welfare and juvenile officer (of the county in which the proceeding was instituted and the judgment was rendered) denies our appellate jurisdiction and prays dismissal of the appeal. The father suggests that this motion to dismiss should not be considered by us because prior notice of the filing of said motion was not given to the father or his counsel in strict accordance with V.A.M.R. Rules 83.12 and 83.02; but, regardless of that, it is as true in this proceeding as in other cases that we remain charged with the duty to inquire, sua sponte, into our jurisdiction and that, if in truth we do not have jurisdiction, a review upon the merits would be a work of intolerable superarrogance predicated upon interdicted usurpation of judicial authority. In re Juvenile Delinquency Appeal, Mo. App., 289 S.W.2d 436, 437(3). Before probing the question of jurisdiction, we appropriately emphasize that, from the institution of this proceeding through the filing of the notice of appeal, the sole attorney of record for the father was a lawyer (hereinafter referred to as out-of-state counsel) who, although a member of the Missouri Bar, resides and offices in a neighboring state, and that distinguished counsel appearing for the father in this court, making the best of an exceedingly difficult situation inherited by them, have presented a comprehensive and cogent brief and have pleaded their client's cause with candor and conviction. In the logical pursuit of our jurisdictional inquiry, we address ourselves to the first point in the motion to dismiss, to wit, that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. As in other cases [e.g., DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 519, 37 S.W.2d 640, 652(13); Franklin v. Franklin, Mo. App., 344 S.W.2d 282, 284(1); State ex rel. Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Public Service Com'n. of Missouri, 231 Mo. App.293, 295, 98 S.W.2d 126, 127(3)], the right of appeal in a proceeding under the Juvenile Act is purely statutory and substantial compliance with the applicable statute is required. In re C , Mo. App., 314 S.W.2d 756, 759(2); State v. Jahnke, 221 Mo. App.366, 273 S.W. 155. And, the Juvenile Act being a complete law or code within itself dealing with minors under the age of seventeen years, 1 Section 211.261 (quoted marginally) 2 is the statute which grants the right of appeal in a proceeding such as this one, and with which substantial compliance must be shown.