United States v. Apple
Competition in America
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- 26,99 €
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- 26,99 €
Publisher Description
One of the most-followed antitrust cases of recent times—United States v. Apple—reveals an often-missed truth: what Americans most fear is competition itself.
In 2012 the Department of Justice accused Apple and five book publishers of conspiring to fix ebook prices. The evidence overwhelmingly showed an unadorned price-fixing conspiracy that cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars. Yet before, during, and after the trial millions of Americans sided with the defendants. Pundits on the left and right condemned the government for its decision to sue, decrying Amazon’s market share, railing against a new high-tech economy, and rallying to defend beloved authors and publishers. For many, Amazon was the one that should have been put on trial. But why? One fact went unrecognized and unreckoned with: in practice, Americans have long been ambivalent about competition.
Chris Sagers, a renowned antitrust expert, meticulously pulls apart the misunderstandings and exaggerations that industries as diverse as mom-and-pop grocers and producers of cast-iron sewer pipes have cited to justify colluding to forestall competition. In each of these cases, antitrust law, a time-honored vehicle to promote competition, is put on the defensive. Herein lies the real insight of United States v. Apple. If we desire competition as a policy, we must make peace with its sometimes rough consequences. As bruising as markets in their ordinary operation often seem, letting market forces play out has almost always benefited the consumer. United States v. Apple shows why supporting cases that protect price competition, even when doing so hurts some of us, is crucial if antitrust law is to protect and maintain markets.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law professor Sagers uses the 2012 Apple e-book price-fixing case to explore opposing attitudes toward antitrust policy in his persuasively argued debut. On the facts, the case against Apple wasn't close, according to Sagers: the evidence "overwhelmingly" established that Apple and five major publishers had conspired to eliminate price competition from the nascent e-book market. But what made the case remarkable, Sagers writes, was the public's reaction to it. Critics on the left excused the conspiracy as "the last stand" of an embattled publishing industry. Those on the right saw the case as unwarranted government intrusion. And virtually everyone thought that Amazon, the supposed victim of the conspiracy, was the real threat. Through an array of concisely rendered, instructive examples from law and history, Sagers explores the public backlash to the Apple case as a "microcosm" of the broader political and societal dilemmas that have effectively hamstrung modern antitrust enforcement. The lasting lesson of the Apple case, he concludes, is that public support is crucial to good antitrust enforcement, and regaining public favor requires fixing the law's current shortcomings and enforcing antitrust statutes "for real." Readers following the recent calls for antitrust action against the tech industry will find this account instructive and timely.