Why We Lost
A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
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- 11,99 €
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- 11,99 €
Publisher Description
A commander’s “compelling” behind-the-scenes view of the United States at war after 9/11, from high-level strategy to combat on the ground (The Wall Street Journal).
Over his thirty-five year career, Daniel P. Bolger rose through the ranks of the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps more than anyone else, he was witness to the full extent of these wars, from September 11th to withdrawal from the region. Not only did Bolger participate in top-level planning and strategy meetings, he also regularly carried a rifle alongside soldiers in combat actions.
Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger argues that while we lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, we did not have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account from a fresh and authoritative perspective, “filled with heartfelt stories of soldiers and Marines in firefights and close combat. It weighs in mightily to the ongoing debate over how the United States should wage war” (The Washington Post).
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Despite this book's subtitle, this is not a first-person narrative detailing exactly how Bolger, who retired in 2013 as a lieutenant general, played a part in America's post-9/11 military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Apart from a frank author's note, which opens with Bolger admitting, hyperbolically, that he "lost the Global War on Terrorism," the work presents an outside view of events, and Bolger doesn't say which specific decisions and battles he was party to. The opening section notes that "there's enough fault to go around, and in this telling, the suits will get their share. But I know better, and so do the rest of the generals.... This was our war to lose, and we did." That provocative stance, which runs counter to the conventional wisdom (that the Pentagon and White House, for instance, made poor political decisions), would be more persuasive had Bolger provided his eyewitness basis for it. On a different note, what feels like a strained effort to be hip undercuts the essential grimness of the books. Apart from these downsides, Bolger offers a comprehensive look at how these wars were fought during his tenure, which for some readers could be a useful introduction to the conflicts. Maps & 16p color insert.
