Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: The Objective Standard for Judicial Recusal‪.‬

On June 8, 2009, the Supreme Court ruled on the fascinating legal saga of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (1) The particular--and seemingly outrageous--facts of the case garnered a tremendous amount of national attention (2) and even inspired a John Grisham novel. (3) At issue in the case was the failure of Justice Brent Benjamin of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to recuse himself from hearing an appeal involving a fifty million dollar judgment against the company of his largest campaign contributor--Don Blankenship, the chairman, CEO, and President of A.T. Massey Coal. Blankenship spent roughly three million dollars of his own personal wealth during the election--an incredibly large amount for any state election, and for West Virginia in particular--to help elect Benjamin to the bench in place of Justice Warren McGraw during the 2004 elections. (4) Naturally, the plaintiff moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin based on the apparent conflict of interest and probable bias caused by Blankenship's campaign involvement. (5) Nonetheless, Justice Benjamin declined to remove himself from the case on three separate occasions and was the deciding vote in a 3-2 reversal of the fifty million dollar trial verdict against Massey. (6) On November 14, 2008, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari (7) to address the question of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when Justice Benjamin denied a recusal motion. (8) Part I of this Note will examine the Caperton case and the new recusal rule based on "probability of bias," which was derived from the case. Part II will explore and scrutinize the concerns expressed by Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent--that the majority's holding in this case would lead to an overwhelming number and variety of "Caperton motions" from parties asserting that the judge in their particular case is biased, primarily because the majority did not provide sufficient guidelines through which to examine future probability of bias claims. (9) While only a year has passed since the Court's ruling in the case, is there any evidence to suggest that state legal systems are struggling with this recusal standard? Was the Chief Justice's use of the old legal aphorism that "[h]ard cases make bad law" justified in this case? (10) Part II will also address the Chief Justice's second concern-that this decision will bring the judicial system into unnecessary disrepute because constant attacks on judicial impartiality will erode public confidence in the system. (11) I argue that lower courts dealing with this new probability of bias standard neither struggle with the content nor overall quantity of so-called "Caperton motions." The use of the probability of bias standard is rare and will neither overwhelm courts nor bring undue disrepute to the bench. (12)