Gilbert Reiter v. Landon Homes Gilbert Reiter v. Landon Homes

Gilbert Reiter v. Landon Homes

NY.43378; 295 N.Y.S.2d 103; 31 A.D.2d 538 (1968)

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[31 A.D.2d 538 Page 539] Defendant, which is the record owner of the premises in dispute, acquired its title under conveyances dated April 11, 1967.
Plaintiff alleges that he commenced adverse possession of the premises in 1954. He contends that his continued adverse possession
for more than 10 years has ripened into title. When plaintiff commenced his adverse possession in 1954, a claimant could not
establish title unless he had been in possession for at least 15 years (Civ. Prac. Act, § 34). Effective September 1, 1963,
however, this period of limitation was reduced to 10 years (CPLR 212, subd. [a]). The theory upon which adverse possession
rests is that the adverse possessor may acquire title at such time as an action in ejectment by the record owner would be
barred by the Statute of Limitations. Nevertheless, a party in whose favor an action accrued prior to the effective date of
CPLR 212 may take advantage of the longer period, provided that such cause of action was not already time-barred when the
CPLR became effective (CPLR 218, subd. [b]). Plaintiff contends that the 10-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 212, subd. [a])
is applicable to the case at bar. He argues that defendant cannot avail itself of the former 15-year Statute of Limitations
pursuant to CPLR 218, subd. (b), because defendant's cause of action (in ejectment) did not accrue until 1967, when defendant
acquired title. This contention lacks merit. It is clear that any of defendant's predecessors in interest whose title was
acquired prior to September 1, 1963 could have availed themselves of the 15-year Statute of Limitations. It is also clear
that, when the property in dispute was conveyed to defendant, plaintiff's possession had not yet ripened into title. We perceive
no reasonable basis for holding that plaintiff's position improved by the purely fortuitous occurrence of conveyances after
September 1, 1963. We are of the opinion that defendant acquired the same rights possessed by its predecessors in interest.
Accordingly, we conclude that the former 15-year Statute of Limitations is applicable hereto (see Matter of City of N. Y.
[ Woodbine Ave. & Hawthorne Ave.], N. Y. L. J., Oct. 13, 1967, p. 19, col. 6). To hold otherwise would create an anomalous
situation in the law of adverse possession, namely, that adverse possessors would be given the right to "tack" continuous
successive periods of possession (Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N. Y. 296), while those who claim title through the record owner
at the time the adverse possession commenced could not assert the rights of their predecessors in interest. We have considered
plaintiff's other contentions and find them to be lacking in merit.

GENRE
Professional & Technical
RELEASED
1968
4 November
LANGUAGE
EN
English
LENGTH
2
Pages
PUBLISHER
LawApp Publishers
SIZE
60
KB

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