![Daniels v. Williams](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
![Daniels v. Williams](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
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Daniels v. Williams
106 S. CT. 662, 474 U.S. 327, 88 L. ED. 2D 662, 54 U.S.L.W. 4090, 1986.SCT.40429
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- $9.00
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- $9.00
Descripción editorial
In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), a state prisoner sued under 42 U. S. C. ? 1983, claiming that prison officials had negligently deprived him of his property without due process of law. After deciding that ? 1983 contains no independent state-of-mind requirement, we concluded that although petitioner had been "deprived" of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the States post-deprivation tort remedy provided the process that was due. Petitioners claim in this case, which also rests on an alleged Fourteenth Amendment "deprivation" caused by the negligent conduct of a prison official, leads us to reconsider our statement in Parratt that "the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation." Id., at 536-537. We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.