Beyond the Wild Blue (2nd edition)
A History of the U.S. Air Force, 1947-2007
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- USD 11.99
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- USD 11.99
Descripción editorial
From the most important leaders and the most courageous victories to the earliest machines of flight and the most advanced Stealth technology, Walter J. Boyne's Beyond the Wild Blue presents a fascinating look at 50 turbulent years of Air Force history.
From the prop-driven armada of World War II to the most advanced Stealth weaponry, from pioneers like General Henry "Hap" Arnold to glorious conquests in the Gulf War, Beyond the Wild Blue is a high-flying study of the triumphs (and failures) of leadership and technology.
In three new chapters, Walter Boyne covers an eventful ten years, including 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the second Gulf War, describing in detail the technological advancements that led to highly efficient airstrikes in Iraq. He also takes stock of the Air Force's doctrine and mission statements as this unique sector of the military grapples with an ever-changing world.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Retired Air Force colonel Boyne (Clash of Titans, 1995, etc.) effectively describes the development of aerospace technology: aircraft, missiles and the electronic systems that shape their employment. His operational narratives, particularly those of MIG Alley during the Korean War and Vietnam's Rolling Thunder, are useful for non-specialists. The intellectual framework of his history of the USAF, however, seldom goes beyond whatever passes as conventional Air Force wisdom on the nature and use of air power. Boyne depicts senior Air Force officers in terms usually reserved for George Washington or Robert E. Lee. Errors of judgment or failures of insight are spin-doctored. He brushes over the long and bitter internecine struggle between tactical and strategic factions, while describing the reorganizing and downsizing of the early 1990s as a harmonious process. Instead of analyzing doctrines and policies, Boyne focuses on criticizing bureaucrats and politicians for repeatedly cutting Air Force strength to the bone, for refusing to fund new weapons systems and for intervening in the conduct of operations. Robert McNamara is a particular villain, repeatedly indicted as responsible for "inane restrictions" and "unreasonable rules of engagement" during the Vietnam War. In developing this argument, Boyne presents what amounts to a theory of betrayal that is unsubstantiated by archival evidence and rejected by Air Force scholars such as Earl Tilford and Mark Clodfelter. Boyne takes a similarly unsophisticated approach to Desert Storm, making claims for air power's role that have been challenged even by Air Force analyses of the campaign. This book cannot be considered a significant contribution to the still-developing field of Air Force history. Photos.
