Beason v. United Technologies Corporation

Argued December 2, 2002 To resolve this appeal, we must construe a Connecticut statute prohibiting discrimination in employment practices in that state. Statutes are not empty vessels into which courts, under the guise of construing a statute, pour meaning. Not because it would spoil the statute in the same sense as pouring new wine into old wineskins ""bursts the skins,"" spills the wine and spoils the skins, Mark 2:22 (R.A. Knox), but because it is the obligation of the courts instead to ascertain the legislature's purpose in enacting the law, as the elected representatives of the people. Such is what we propose to do in this case. Donald Beason (plaintiff, employee, or appellant) appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated March 19, 2002 (Droney, J.), that granted a motion for summary judgment made by his employer, the United Technologies Corporation, Hamilton Standard Division (defendant, employer, Hamilton Standard, or company) and dismissed his discrimination claim. Plaintiff alleges that the company perceived him to be disabled and based on that misperception discriminated against him. Although we affirm, we do so for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court.