Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons
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- € 9,99
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- € 9,99
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“Brilliant, original, and important—the best analysis yet of why nuclear weapons don’t work.” —Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb
Nuclear weapons have always been a serious but seemingly insoluble problem: while they’re obviously dangerous, they are also, apparently, necessary. This groundbreaking study shows why five central arguments promoting nuclear weapons are, in essence, myths. It clears up such common misconceptions as . . .
• Nuclear weapons necessarily shock and awe opponents, including Japan at the end of World War II
• Nuclear deterrence is reliable in a crisis
• Destruction wins wars
• The bomb has kept the peace for sixty-five years
• We can’t put the nuclear genie back in the bottle
Drawing on new information and the latest historical research, Wilson poses a fundamental challenge to the myths on which nuclear weapons policy is currently built. Using pragmatic arguments and an unemotional, clear-eyed insistence on the truth, he arrives at a surprising conclusion: nuclear weapons are enormously dangerous, but don’t appear to be terribly useful. In that case, he asks, why would we want to keep them?
This book will be widely read and discussed by everyone who cares about war, peace, foreign policy, and security in the twenty-first century.
“Magisterial in its sweep, research, and erudition, yet written in a direct, unstuffy style, which makes it an easy read.” —Commander Robert D. Green, Royal Navy (ret.)
“This slim, persuasively argued, tightly written book provides much food for thought and could make some readers radically change their perceptions about nuclear weapons.” —Booklist
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
In this concise analysis of commonly held beliefs about nuclear weapons, Wilson argues that, from the bombing of Hiroshima, policy has been decided based on mistaken suppositions. The first is that the dropping of atomic bombs caused Japan to surrender, rather than the invasion of Manchuria by the formerly neutral Russians. This convenient lie was agreed to by both sides for propaganda purposes. Therefore, according to Wilson, the myth was born that nuclear weapons are so devastating that their existence prevents their use. He points out, with examples, that "destruction does not determine who wins or loses a war." The Cuban Missile Crisis is considered not as proof of the myth but as a negation of it. Another myth Wilson debunks is that the fear of nuclear catastrophe has prevented World War III. He concludes by asking for a revision of attitude because as long as nuclear bombs are viewed as a deterrent to war, nuclear weapons will proliferate. When these myths are extinguished, he contends, nuclear weapons can be discarded as a dangerous tool that is ineffective for the task. Wilson's theories are certain to create discussion and a reevaluation of assumptions on the topic.
