Keeping Up With the Neighbors: Nonproliferation and Implementation of UNSCR 1540 - Regime Compliance With Resolution Mandating Domestic Legislation to Counter WMD and Dual-use Technology Proliferation

This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Liberal international relations theories predict that states with respect for the rule of law will more readily comply with their international obligations. This paper tests this prediction against compliance within the nonproliferation regime and specifically with UNSCR 1540, a resolution mandating that member nations enact domestic legislation to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and certain dual use technologies. Using a rule of law measure based upon contract intensive money, the findings lend strong support for a positive relationship between rule of law states and compliance with nonproliferation norms. However, there is no support for the relationship between rule of law and implementation of specific UN-mandated tenets of UNSCR 1540. The influence of regional compliance is strong across both models. This study contributes to an understanding of the predictors of regime compliance, lending support to liberal theory and even the democratic peace literature.

This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

The international community has long sought to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The most significant efforts have been codified as multilateral agreements—"security regimes"—signed by states, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Convention on Toxin and Biological Weapons (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even though efforts to negotiate and ratify these agreements occur at the international level, their success depends upon the behavior of actors within the domestic sphere. Non-state groups and even individuals have stated their desire to acquire WMD, and this possibility remains a key concern of U.S. policy. There is therefore a gap between the obligations incurred by national governments and the potential actions of individuals and groups that have not made these commitments on their own. In order to bridge this gap, states can create domestic enablers to support international regimes. Among the domestic enablers is codification of the regime's tenets in domestic law. In order to understand whether non-proliferation regimes are likely to be effective, we must identify the factors that allow for the domestic enforcement of these agreements. This effort is part of a larger project that seeks to answer: What predicts the success of the non-proliferation regime?