Vietnam's Second Front

The effects of domestic politics on the Vietnam War are revealed in this groundbreaking historical study by the author of The Price of Loyalty.
 
In Vietnam's Second Front, Andrew L.Johns examines how American domestic politics effected the Vietnam War. He pays special attention to the role of the Republican Party, from the Nixon administration to grassroots organizations. The revealing analysis sheds new light on the relationship between Congress and the imperial presidency as they struggled for control over US foreign policy.
 
Johns argues that, from 1961 through the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations failed to achieve victory on both fronts of the Vietnam War―military and political―because of their preoccupation with domestic politics. Johns details the political dexterity required of all three presidents and of members of Congress to maneuver between the countervailing forces of escalation and negotiation, offering a provocative account of the ramifications of their decisions.
 
With clear, incisive prose and extensive archival research, Johns's analysis covers the broad range of the Republican Party's impact on the Vietnam War, offers a compelling reassessment of responsibility for the conflict, and challenges assumptions about the roles of Congress and the president in US foreign relations.