Representational Content and the Objects of Thought Representational Content and the Objects of Thought

Representational Content and the Objects of Thought

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Descripción editorial

It is commonly held that our beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and that a belief’s truth value (true or false) depends on the truth value of the proposition toward which it is an attitude. From this plausible view Rimell builds a theory of mental representation with two striking features. First, our “I” beliefs have private content—content that only a single subject can entertain. Second, it is impossible to think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus, the fountain of youth). In light of the latter claim, Rimell offers an error theory meant to explain what we are doing when we think we’re thinking about nonexistents. To non-specialists, this book serves as a clear, careful introduction to central questions at the intersection of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind: Are thought and meaning entirely in the head? What’s special about first-personal thought and speech? How (if at all) can we think about nonexistents, given that prima facie thinking involves a relation between a subject and an object of thought? To specialists, this book is designed to challenge the standard ways of thinking about these questions and to offer a unified response to them.

GÉNERO
No ficción
PUBLICADO
2021
30 de septiembre
IDIOMA
EN
Inglés
EXTENSIÓN
228
Páginas
EDITORIAL
Springer Nature Singapore
VENDEDOR
Springer Nature B.V.
TAMAÑO
1.2
MB