![United States v. Lemmons](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
![United States v. Lemmons](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
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United States v. Lemmons
282 F.3d 920, 2002.C07.0000093
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- USD 0.99
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- USD 0.99
Descripción editorial
Argued November 2, 2001 Much like the ""interactive process"" required of employers and employees in cases involving reasonable accommodations under the ADA, a ""consent"" to search often involves a little bit of give-and-take between police and a person giving permission for a search. Unraveling what occurred during that exchange is the stuff of suppression hearings in the district court, and a judgment on what happened (and what consequences flow from what happened) is usually a very fact-intensive inquiry. So it is in this case. This case comes to us after Shelby Lemmons pled guilty to charges of using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a videotape in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 2251(a) (Count I) and, on the basis of three computer images, possessing computer files containing depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Count II). Lemmons' guilty pleas were conditioned on his ability to air, on appeal, his claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.