Ziccardi's Case

RUGG, Chief Justice. This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employee invokes St. 1932, c. 117, § 1, amending G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, § 12. The pertinent facts are that the employee on June 21, 1924, sustained a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Under an agreement he was paid compensation to March 12, 1925, when it was discontinued by order of the board. He filed claim for compensation in April, 1925. It was found by the single member that his condition had no causal relation to his injury. That decision was affirmed by the board on review in August, 1925, and no appeal was taken. The case was heard again in December, 1925, by the single member who ruled that under the decision of August, 1925, the rights of the employee had terminated. That decision was affirmed on review and no appeal was taken. The case was heard again in June, 1933, under St. 1932, c. 117. It comes before us on report as to the constitutionality of that statute. In Brode's Case, 251 Mass. 414, 146 N.E. 731, it was adJudged that a finding by a single member of the board to the effect that, although there had been payments made to an employee by way of compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment, all incapacity therefrom had come to an end, and that the payments should therefore be discontinued without any reservation of further rights under the act, was a final determination, that the rights are not kept open and that the employee could not thereafter obtain further payments under the act. The same principle applies to a finding on review by the Industrial Accident Board. That decision was followed and affirmed in McCarthy's Case, 253 Mass. 553, 149 N.E. 606, and O'Neil's Case, 262 Mass. 266, 159 N.E. 731. Thus the act provided for a finding final in its nature that the employee was no longer suffering any incapacity from his injury, that payments to him should stop and the insurer be free from further liability. Under the authority of these decisions the employee's right to further compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act has come to an end in the case at bar. The contrary has not been contended. The act was changed in this particular by St. 1929, c. 246 (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 152, § 12) so that such finding that incapacity had ceased should not be considered final and that further hearings might be had and further compensation awarded. There was no retroactive provision in that statute. Therefore the employee acquired no rights under it. Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 107 N.E. 426, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 145. By St. 1932, c. 117, the act was further amended by embodying in section 1 the substance of St. 1929, c. 246, and by providing in section 2 that the act 'shall apply to cases wherein compensation has been paid * * * subsequent to January first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five.' By Casieri's Case (Mass.) 190 N.E. 118, decided since the report was made in the case at bar, it was held upon mature deliberation that St. 1932, c. 117, § 2, in so far as it undertook to authorize the reopening of cases finally determined, according to the principle of Brode's Case, 251 Mass. 414, 146 N.E. 731, before its enactment, took away a property right secured to the insurer by the Constitution and therefore was violative of its constitutional rights and could not be enforced. Clearly under these decisions the employee cannot maintain his petition for further compensation.