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INTRODUCTION The subjective theory of value has a long and uneasy history (Grice-Hutchinson, 1952; Hutchison, 1994). In the course of its wide utilization, subjectivism is often situated at the core of intricate debates in economics. While Mises ( 2003, pp. 183-186) criticizes Menger's ( 1994) conception of subjectivism, Bohm-Bawerk ([1884-1912] 1959) defends it against Jevons ( 1888). Lachmann (1976, 1978b) looks for an extension of subjectivism beyond the extension advocated by Hayek (1952). Rothbard criticizes both propositions for extending the subjective theory of value (1957, 1973, 1997) and defends Mises's definition ( 1998). More recently, this debate has attracted the attention of other scholars. Hoppe (1995, 1998), who reiterates the Rothbardian position, argues against Lavoie (1990, 1994a, 1994b), O'Driscoll, and Rizzo (1985, 1986), who follow the Lachmannian view on subjectivism. Caplan (1999, p. 827)--who sees only insignificant differences between the Austrian school and the neo-classical conceptions of the subjective theory of value--is criticized by Block (1999, pp. 23-25). However, the areas covered by these debates on subjectivism are extremely heterogeneous. For instance, economists deploy subjectivism in relation to utility, ordinal evaluation, radical uncertainty, expectations, etc. Yet, despite its widespread use within the field of economics, subjectivism remains an ill-defined term, which accounts for the difficulty in reaching a further understanding of the previously mentioned debates.