Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?
Stanford Journal of International Law 2006, Summer, 42, 2
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Descrição da editora
I. INTRODUCTION If the President loses centrist American political support for continuing the war in Iraq, members of Congress might employ their most legally potent, yet controversial, tool to speed our exit, or at least to change policy. Namely, they can attach conditions--typically in the form of provisions added to the war funding and Iraq aid appropriations, known as "riders" because of how they "ride" on the underlying bill--pushing the military ground combat operations toward an earlier exit. (1)
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