Hewell Jamar v. Gayle Patterson

Per Curiam This case presents the issue of what constitutes "filing" a motion for new trial for purposes of calculating the
appellate timetable. After a jury trial the trial judge signed a judgment for Gayle Patterson, individually and as next friend
of Brandi Istre (Patterson), against Hewell Jamar. The judgment is dated October 16, 1992. On November 12, 1992, counsel for
Jamar tendered his motion to the district clerk, who did not "accept" the motion for filing because Jamar had not paid the
requisite $15.00 statutory filing fee.1 Despite its other deficiencies,2 the clerk file-stamped the motion on November
30, 1992, when the $15.00 filing fee was received. Jamar then filed an appeal bond which was timely if his motion for new trial were timely filed to extend the appellate deadline,
but untimely if he were limited to thirty days after judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a). The court of appeals, in a two-paragraph
unpublished opinion, stated that Jamar's motion was "filed" on November 30, 1992, when it was file-stamped, and dismissed
his appeal. The court of appeals did not state either that the file-stamp was controlling or that payment of the filing fee
was a requirement for filing, but presumably it impliedly made one or the other of those holdings.