People State New York v. Edward Ingram

[49 A.D.2d 865 Page 865] Study of the record discloses the following errors: (1) the prosecutor improperly argued in summation that an acquittal would be tantamount to a finding that the police officers who testified for the People were guilty of perjury. Justification for the comment on the ground that it was a fair response to the defense summation is belied by the record; (2) the prosecutor improperly referred in summation to the defendant's failure to call a certain witness to corroborate his testimony as to what brought him to the street where the arrest was made (see People v Cwikla, 45 A.D.2d 584); (3) in its charge on reasonable doubt, the court used the hearts and consciences phraseology heretofore criticized as improper (see People v Johnson, 46 A.D.2d 123, 127, People v Harding, 44 A.D.2d 800, 801); (4) the charge concerning character evidence was not properly delivered. It is well recognized that evidence of good character is a matter of substance; not of form, in criminal cases, and must be considered by the jury as bearing upon the issue of guilt, even when the evidence against the defendant may be very convincing. What weight shall be given to it is a question for the jury (People v Colantone, 243 NY 134, 136). After correctly charging the jury on the effect of character evidence, the trial court unaccountably employed phraseology shifting the emphasis from a consideration of character evidence with all the other evidence in the case to one wherein even if the testimony of defendant's good character is believed it cannot save him from the consequences of his crime. The correct rule was enunciated in People v Trimarchi (231 NY 263, 266): Evidence of good character is not, of itself, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. Such evidence, in order to raise a reasonable doubt, must be believed by the jury. It then may, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This is upon the theory that good character may create a doubt against positive evidence, but this doubt against positive evidence is created only when in the judgment of the jury the character is so good as to raise a doubt as to the truthfulness of the positive evidence tending to establish guilt. In such case the defendant would be given the benefit of the doubt. (See People v Miller, 35 N.Y.2d 65.) The above enumerated errors are such that taken in conjunction they patently deprived defendant of a fair trial as a matter of law. Finally, the [49 A.D.2d 865 Page 866]