Intra-Administration Conflict: The CIA V. The State Department in South Vietnam During the Kennedy Years‪.‬

ABSTRACT Students of foreign policy have much to learn from the controversial South Vietnam conflict. This article concentrates on the role performed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State before the United States engaged in a massive commitment of troops and material to South Vietnam. Thus, it is limited in it scope of concern. It is primarily concerned with the time period before 1965. The post 1965 period was quite different in terms of American activity, and this paper does not attempt to comment on it in any significant way except to note changes regarding the control of the Agency have come about. Nevertheless, the lessons learned from the pre-1965 time period regarding intra-administration conflict are still applicable. Perhaps, this is the value of history. The emergence of a clash between these two important elements in American foreign policy-making during the early years of the South Vietnam conflict appears evident. (In addition, the author concludes with suggestions for improving not only American foreign policy-making, but also with the hope that the Central Intelligence Agency pursues a policy of objectivity and detachment in its pursuit of intelligence.