Preventing the Misuse of Gene Synthesis: Fostering Industry Self-Regulation, Backed up with Targeted Government Policies, Is the Best Way to Capture the Benefits and Reduce the Risks of Synthetic Genomics (Double-Edged DNA)
Issues in Science and Technology 2010, Spring, 26, 3
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Publisher Description
During the past decade, a global industry has emerged based on synthetic genomics: the use of automated machines to construct genes and other long strands of DNA by stringing together chemical building blocks called nucleotides in any desired sequence. Some 50 companies--concentrated primarily in the United States, Germany, and China--synthesize gene-length segments of double-stranded DNA to order. Scientists in government, university, and pharmaceutical laboratories worldwide use these products to study fundamental cellular processes and to develop new vaccines and medicines, among other beneficial applications. But synthetic genomics presents a dual-use dilemma in that outlaw states or terrorist groups could potentially exploit synthetic DNA for harmful purposes. Of the biotechnologies that entail dual-use risks, gene synthesis has elicited the greatest concern because of its maturity, availability, and potential consequences. Already, the ability to synthesize long strands of DNA and stitch them together into a genome, the blueprint of an organism, has enabled scientists to recreate infectious viruses from scratch in the laboratory. This feat was accomplished for poliovirus in 2002, the Spanish influenza virus in 2005, and the SARS virus in 2008. Some analysts worry that it will soon become technically feasible to synthesize the smallpox virus, a deadly scourge that was eradicated from nature in the late 1970s and currently exists only in a few highly secure repositories.