Collins v. Thuringer

2. What was the extent of the attorneys lien? Collins claims that his lien not only secures his fees in obtaining the judgment in case No. 101,275, but also secures a general balance due him for services performed for Edith Thuringer in various matters not at all connected with that litigation. To sustain his contention, he relies upon Fillmore v. Wells, supra. The law recognizes two classes of attorneys liens; a general, retaining or possessory lien, and a special, particular or charging lien. The former attaches to all papers, books, documents, securities and money coming into an attorneys possession in the course of his professional employment. The attorney has a right to retain them in his possession until the general balance due him for legal services is paid, whether such services grew out of the special matters then in his hands, or other legal matters. The right to the special, particular or charging lien, on the other hand, rests, not on possession, but on the equity of an attorney to be paid his fees and disbursements out of the judgment obtained as a result of his service and skill. 2 R.C.L. p. 1063, 1069; 6 C.J. p. 765, et seq. There is a clear distinction between the two classes of liens. It is said that a failure to distinguish between them has led to confusion, not to say conflict, in the decisions. 2 R.C.L. p. 1063.