Compensation and Board Structure: Evidence from the Insurance Industry.
Journal of Risk and Insurance 2010, June, 77, 2
-
- $5.99
-
- $5.99
Publisher Description
ABSTRACT Monitoring by outside board members and incentive compensation provisions in executive pay packages are alternative mechanisms for controlling incentive problems between owners and managers. The control hypothesis suggests that if incentive conflicts vary materially, those firms with more outside directors also should implement a higher degree of pay-for-performance sensitivity. Our evidence is consistent with this control hypothesis. We document a relation between board structure and the extent to which executive compensation is tied to performance in mutuals: compensation changes are significantly more sensitive to changes in return on assets when the fraction of outsiders on the board is high.
More Books Like This
Earnings Smoothing, Executive Compensation, And Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Property-Liability Insurance Industry.
2011
Contracting Incentives and Compensation for Property-Liability Insurer Executives.
2004
Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance
2007
Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance
2016
Advances in Financial Economics
2012
Explaining Executive Pay
2007
More Books by Journal of Risk and Insurance
U.S. Health-Care Reform: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
2010
Introductory Stochastic Analysis for Finance and Insurance.
2011
Reinsurance and Capital Structure: Evidence from the United Kingdom Non-Life Insurance Industry (Report)
2011
Personal Bias in Automobile Claims Settlement (Statistical Data Included)
2003
Catastrophe Risk Financing in the United States and the European Union: A Comparative Analysis of Alternative Regulatory Approaches.
2009
A Reexamination of the Corporate Demand for Reinsurance.
2006