Complete Guide to Operation Anaconda in the Afghanistan War: Air Power Close Air Support Case Study, Air and Ground Doctrine Lessons, Long-Distance Leadership Criticisms, Lessons for Joint Operations

This unique report compilation has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Four important reports about Operation Anaconda during the Afghanistan War are reproduced:

Criticisms Associated With Operation Anaconda - Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective? * Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations * Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed? * An Air Power Perspective

One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare.

From 2-16 March 2002, a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), built around 1,411 U.S. Army soldiers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations took on the task of clearing the Shahi Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces who had survived earlier battles. It was a complex, non-linear battle that demanded full integration of Joint forces—and, to the frustration of all, revealed some Joint warfighting stress points.

For the first time in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces were locked in a prolonged ground battle in difficult terrain. Eight Americans (5 U.S. Army, 2 USAF and 1 U.S. Navy SEAL) died during Operation ANACONDA and 80 were wounded. Seven of those deaths came on 4 March 2002 at the ridgeline at Takur Gar during a helicopter insertion of a Special Forces team and an attempt to rescue them.

Operation ANACONDA also turned out to be an acid test of land and air component cooperation in a pitched fight. The al-Qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in prepared defensive positions in the 10,000-foot mountains and rained mortars and small arms fire down on the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen holding blocking positions below. Over the next two weeks, bombers, fighters, helicopters and AC-130 gunships delivered close air support (CAS) into the postage-stamp size battle area measuring about 8 nautical miles (nm) x 8 nm. Deconfliction and coordination of this "fire support" proved challenging with friendly troops and controllers in a small area. In the air, funneling the strikes in was just as intense, and strike aircraft reported several near misses as one pulled up from an attack run while another rolled onto the target. After initial contact sparked heavy fighting, air controllers attached to ground forces or airborne in OA-10 Thunderbolts called in airpower to provide immediate close air support.

Ultimately, Operation ANACONDA was a success. "Operation ANACONDA sought to clear the enemy in that valley area and in those hills," said General Tommy R. Franks, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), "and succeeded in doing so where many operations in history had not been able to get that done." However, it was also an object lesson in the complexities of planning and executing rapid air support for ground operations in a hostile, rugged environment. The report that follows seeks to document air and ground operations during the battle in a case-study format. It offers new statistical analysis from a joint database of the immediate close air support delivered during the battle.