This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Since the findings of the 9/11 Commission were released in July of 2004, and even before, U.S. counterterrorism policy proffered a strategy to preemptively "attack terrorists and their organizations." Al Qaida (AQ), a violent extremist organization (VEO), is responsible for the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC). Due to U.S. military operations to oust AQ from the sanctuary provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan in October of 2001, several of its senior leaders fled and remain at large in the sanctuary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. Denying sanctuary in the FATA is a national priority critical to regional stability and global security. During this same period of time, however, the U.S. national strategy for combating terrorism and the U.S.'s zeal to capture or kill the high-profile personalities responsible for the devastating attack on the WTC led to well-intended, but misappropriated, resources and separate agency plans. These plans focused on targeting individuals as the way to defeat the "global insurgency" rather than targeting the strategic pillars of terrorist organizations and transnational insurgencies. Counterterrorism (CT) strategists and intelligence professionals have characterized AQ and its loose network of like-minded terrorist groups a "global insurgency."
It was determined that both the United States Government (USG) and the Government of Pakistan (GOP) approaches are not sufficiently addressing the operational elements of sanctuary. Moreover, USG/GOP COIN methods may actually be perpetuating the insurgencies as evidenced by their growing disruptive activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan and their intentions for greater instability in the region. Further, it was determined that "whole-of-international-community" effort focused on reducing the operational elements of the FATA's sanctuary is the best approach to deny sanctuary and defeat the insurgencies that reside there. The U.S. must work with its allies to disrupt AQ attacks on the Homeland and U.S. interests abroad while simultaneously providing Pakistan, a critical U.S. partner, the time, space, capabilities, and capacities to defeat its own insurgencies in the region, which if left unattended, could emerge into a regional or global crisis.
Chapter One - Sanctuary as a Concept in Insurgency * Introduction * The Critical Factors - Security and Freedom of Movement * Terms - Sanctuary and Safe Haven * Concept of Sanctuary and its Physical and Human Operational Elements * Chapter Two - Case Studies Analysis of Twentieth-Century Insurgencies * Introduction and Case Study Analysis Construct * The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) * Introduction * Physical element * Human element * COIN approach * Conclusion * The Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) * Introduction * Physical element * Human element * COIN approach * Conclusion * The Hukbalahap Insurrection (1946-1955) * Introduction * Physical element * Human element * COIN approach * Conclusion * Chapter Conclusion - Summary of Findings from Historical Insurgencies Analysis * Chapter Three - FATA (A Tale of Three Insurgencies in a Land of Eternal Sanctuary) * Introduction * The Regional Situation * The Enemy - the Insurgencies that Dwell, Survive, and Flourish in the FATA * Conditions of Sanctuary * Physical element * Human element * The Bifurcated, Insurgent-centric COIN Approach to Date * Chapter Four - Conclusion & Epilogue * Conclusion * Epilogue