Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Regime‪.‬

Each year the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime becomes more uncertain. In the past year alone: North Korea has become the first country ever to withdraw from the treaty, and there has been virtually no progress and considerable regression on the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The United States has reasserted policies of nuclear weapons use that undermine the negative security assurances promised to non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT in 1978 and again at the 1995 NFT Review and Extension Conference. The doctrine of preemption--or more accurately of preventive war--as pursued by the United States and adopted by other states with nuclear weapons threatens to accelerate nuclear weapons proliferation in the face of the threat of aggressive use of force. In addition, bilateral policies of the nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT are increasingly integrating those nuclear weapons states outside of the NPT regime--India, Israel, and Pakistan--as legitimate nuclear powers through the elimination of sanctions and technology exchanges. The NPT regime obligations are having less and less success in restraining the irresponsible behavior of nations, especially the treaty's nuclear weapons states and the United States in particular. As nuclear weapons states move further away from their obligations tinder the treaty, they simultaneously weaken incentives for non-nuclear weapons state parties to the treaty to remain within the NPT regime. If such regressions continue, they will inevitably lead to an abandonment of disarmament goals and the gradual lack of interest by nonnuclear weapons states to remain within the regime's boundaries. It is time for members of the NPT regime to issue a clear statement outlining how the treaty is being undermined and by whom.