Game Theoretic Analysis

This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts. Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium Analysis In game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field. Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values It is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.Contents: Introduction (David W K Yeung and Leon A Petrosyan) Part 1: Non-Cooperative Games and Equilibrium Analysis: On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Duopolistic Market Share Model (J M Binner, F Ciardiello, L R Fletcher and V N Kolokoltsov) Maximin and Minimax Strategies in Two-Players Game with Two Strategic Variables (Atsuhiro Satoh and Yasuhito Tanaka) Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project (Sebastien Rouillon) Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games: A New Approach via Information Updating (David Yeung and Ovanes Petrosian) Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction (Fouad El Ouardighi, Gary Erickson, Dieter Grass and Steffen Jørgensen) Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem (V V Mazalov and A V Melnik) Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly (Koji Okuguchi and Takeshi Yamazaki) Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria (Gisèle Umbhauer) Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility (Pierre Von Mouche and Takashi Sato) Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria (Thomas A Weber) Equilibria in Dynamic Multicriteria Games (Anna Rettieva) Economic Problems with Constraints: How Efficiency Relates to Equilibrium (Jacek B Krawczyk and Mabel Tidball) Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability (Harborne Stuart Jr) Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values: On Analyzing Cost Allocation Problems: Cooperation Building Structures and Order Problem Representations (John Kleppe, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx and Hans Reijnierse) Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context (Evangelos Toumasatos and Stein Ivar Steinshamn) Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly (Mario A García-Meza, Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova and José Daniel López-Barrientos) A Cooperative Dynamic Environmental Game of Subgame Consistent Clean...