Harris v. Moore Associates of Topeka

The opinion of the court was delivered by This is an appeal from a lump sum judgment based upon a
workmen's compensation award under G.S. 1949, 44-512a. The real
point in the appeal is a contention that under that section of
the workmen's compensation act the employee would not have a
right to demand payment under his award of the commissioner until
time for appeal had expired and the award had become final. That
is, appellants frankly argue that this court was in error in
deciding the recent case of Bentley v. State Department of
Social Welfare, 187 Kan. 340, 356 P.2d 791. The facts of this case were stipulated in the trial court, and
for the purposes of this opinion may be summarized as follows:
Appellee was employed by appellant Moore Associates as a
carpenter; as a result of an accident on November 13, 1959, the
employee received a compensation award for temporary total
disability on May 16, 1960. On May 19, 1960, the workman by
registered mail demanded payment of his award as provided in
section 44-512a. This letter was sent to both appellants and to
their attorney and was received by the parties on May 23, 1960.
On May 27, 1960, the present appellants appealed from the
workmen's compensation award to the district court of Shawnee
county. On June 15, 1960, appellants paid the workman the sum of
$760 under the order of the workmen's compensation award and also
began making weekly payments as therein provided. On June 24,
appellants also paid to the workman's doctor the amount then due
him as provided in the award. Thereafter, upon motion of the
appellee, on October 7, 1960, the district court dismissed
appellants' appeal from the workmen's compensation award on the
theory that appellants had acquiesced in the award by making the
above payments. (It should be noted that we express no opinion as
to the correctness of this holding of the trial court.) On
December 5, 1960, the present appellants attempted to appeal from
the last action of the district court, but their appeal was found
to have been out of time by this court and was dismissed.