Senior Living and Healthcare Real Estate
A Practitioner's Guide to Rent Cover, Payor Mix, EBITDARM and What an Operating Asset Is Actually Worth
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- $12.99
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- $12.99
Publisher Description
A care home is an operating business that happens to own a building, sold to investors who mostly buy buildings. Someone will value this one at £16.8 million and someone else at £14.2 million, and they are looking at the same roof.
Three numbers the sector types in, and this book derives. Occupancy is not an input: 2.79 admissions a month against an average stay of 22.5 months produce 89.5 per cent. Stop admitting and a home does not plateau — it empties. The payor mix is not an input either: 55 per cent of admissions arrive self-funding and 36.4 per cent of the BEDS still do, because capital runs down at £5,574 a month and the council takes over at £273 a week less. That erosion is 18.6 points and it can never run the other way. And the staff cost is not a percentage: it is 4.55 hours of care per resident per day, delivered by 61.5 full-time equivalents whose roster is 15.5 per cent bigger than the rota, carried by 115 employment contracts — because employer national insurance is charged per contract while auto-enrolment runs the opposite way.
The identity almost nobody writes down. Cover times yield times multiple equals one, exactly, so the three ratios quoted about every transaction are two judgements and a consequence. At 11.00x and 6.0 per cent the implied cover is 1.52x, not the 1.80x in the term sheet, and the difference is £2.7 million of value. The same arithmetic prices a sale and leaseback honestly: it creates nothing unless a leased operating company trades above 6.15x times EBITDA, because the residual is geared 3.53x to the trade.
And the finding that inverts the received view. Over twenty-five years the rent index runs slower than the trade, so the cover a lender monitors RISES from 1.80x to 1.96x — while the margin falls 4.2 points. The covenant is never tested and the business is squeezed the whole way. A cover ratio cannot see that, and the book argues for a margin covenant instead.
One risk with no analogue in property. A regulatory rating drops and admissions stop. Nothing else changes — no fee falls, no wage rises. The home bottoms at 69.6 per cent occupancy, takes 4.0 years to recover and costs £1.4 million: more than a year of every operating lever in the book combined.
Written for investors and asset managers, operators negotiating leases and management contracts, lenders sizing against an income re-earned every month, developers — the same scheme returns an 8.8 per cent yield on cost and still does not clear a development margin, which explains the supply of new beds better than any demographic projection — and anyone handed a memorandum whose headline is an occupancy rate and a private-pay percentage.
1701 controls run over the model. Four Excel workbooks accompany the book, with no sign-up, and each ends with a sheet comparing every figure the book prints against what the workbook computes.
How this book was made: written with the help of artificial intelligence tools, under the author's direction; every figure was checked against its source.