Japan 1941
Countdown to Infamy
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4.4 • 35 Ratings
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- $11.99
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- $11.99
Publisher Description
A groundbreaking history that considers the attack on Pearl Harbor from the Japanese perspective and is certain to revolutionize how we think of the war in the Pacific.
When Japan launched hostilities against the United States in 1941, argues Eri Hotta, its leaders, in large part, understood they were entering a war they were almost certain to lose. Drawing on material little known to Western readers, and barely explored in depth in Japan itself, Hotta poses an essential question: Why did these men—military men, civilian politicians, diplomats, the emperor—put their country and its citizens so unnecessarily in harm’s way? Introducing us to the doubters, schemers, and would-be patriots who led their nation into this conflagration, Hotta brilliantly shows us a Japan rarely glimpsed—eager to avoid war but fraught with tensions with the West, blinded by reckless militarism couched in traditional notions of pride and honor, tempted by the gambler’s dream of scoring the biggest win against impossible odds and nearly escaping disaster before it finally proved inevitable.
In an intimate account of the increasingly heated debates and doomed diplomatic overtures preceding Pearl Harbor, Hotta reveals just how divided Japan’s leaders were, right up to (and, in fact, beyond) their eleventh-hour decision to attack. We see a ruling cadre rich in regional ambition and hubris: many of the same leaders seeking to avoid war with the United States continued to adamantly advocate Asian expansionism, hoping to advance, or at least maintain, the occupation of China that began in 1931, unable to end the second Sino-Japanese War and unwilling to acknowledge Washington’s hardening disapproval of their continental incursions. Even as Japanese diplomats continued to negotiate with the Roosevelt administration, Matsuoka Yosuke, the egomaniacal foreign minister who relished paying court to both Stalin and Hitler, and his facile supporters cemented Japan’s place in the fascist alliance with Germany and Italy—unaware (or unconcerned) that in so doing they destroyed the nation’s bona fides with the West.
We see a dysfunctional political system in which military leaders reported to both the civilian government and the emperor, creating a structure that facilitated intrigues and stoked a jingoistic rivalry between Japan’s army and navy. Roles are recast and blame reexamined as Hotta analyzes the actions and motivations of the hawks and skeptics among Japan’s elite. Emperor Hirohito and General Hideki Tojo are newly appraised as we discover how the two men fumbled for a way to avoid war before finally acceding to it.
Hotta peels back seventy years of historical mythologizing—both Japanese and Western—to expose all-too-human Japanese leaders torn by doubt in the months preceding the attack, more concerned with saving face than saving lives, finally drawn into war as much by incompetence and lack of political will as by bellicosity. An essential book for any student of the Second World War, this compelling reassessment will forever change the way we remember those days of infamy.
Customer Reviews
Any Idea Can Be Justified
Japan 1941 is a beautifully written narrative with timeless implications. The main point to this reader is that even sane, reasonable, intelligent people can justify even the most horrendous, destructive proposal if the circumstances are right and “self pity” prevail.
Very interesting
Provides useful and unique context to the deeper questions relating to what triggered the Pacific War. Lengthy detailed but very interesting drama of what seems to have been a contentious confused if not incoherent and ultimately catastrophic decision making process dominated by military hardliners whose victories over Russia, China and other lesser local powers as well as continuing influence of the anachronistic Samurai culture caused them to be inappropriately overconfident vis-a-vis the US with much greater capability. A few, such as Adm Yamamoto recognized the danger. It seems that this was facilitated by weak unassertive civilian leaders who did not adequately envision the likely course of events or have strong nonmilitary alternatives to the objective of elevating Japan to further greatness. In a phrase it was a completely messed-up high level decision making process. Here is where it would have been helpful to have had a more clear delineation of the governmental structure and designed vs. actual functioning and a determination as to whether this mess was inherent in a flawed governmental design or just the confluence of flawed leadership and obviously flawed/inadequate thinking.
Additionally this book provides some perspective on the unfortunate, ill-fated US-Japan diplomatic efforts to prevent the War. Given the, by then, well established trend of warfare as the predominant mode of Japanese foreign policy, it is likely that Japan would have eventually triggered a war with the US even if the diplomatic efforts prevented for a while the 12/7 attacks. However, it seems that this was in some ways a huge unfortunate diplomatic debacle with both sides being intransigent and irrationally wedded to immaleable requirements that in fact should have and could have remained flexible. One has to wonder if the intercepted diplomatic notes from Japanese diplomatic channels were actually counterproductive for the US. Nonetheless it was all another part of the greater irrational ineffective foolishness.
This is a nicely written interesting book. Certainly it is a huge challenge to write as interesting a book on an extended decision making process by a bunch of government burocrats but Ms. Hotta to her great credit did just that, and that obviously reflects directly on her intelligence and craftsmanship. My wish is that Ms. Hotta would write a complementary book that would provide more detail on the parallel viewpoints, attitudes, and social context of the Japanese people during this same timeframe. Were the Japanese people mostly oblivious, confused, supportive or was there generalized growing concern and anxiety? Were the Japanese complicit or left out of the process only to suffer the catastrophic fate of extremely bad decision making? How did the Japanese envision the likely course of events? So many important questions because this is obviously such a critical case study for generations to remain familiar with and to continue to discuss.
A detailed look at the other side
I've studied Pearl Harbor for over 45 years. I've personally interviewed over 20 survivors of the attack and visited Pearl many times. I find answers to questions only to find more questions.
This book covers in detail a side seldom discussed except in overall terms. Hotta exposes the lack of leadership by those who knew the consequences of their actions yet lacked the will to forcefully act. Many in the West want to blame Roosevelt for pushing Japan into the war. Hotta shows that the West was almost left little choice but to act. You might not agree with Hotta's conclusions but you will be forced to think and question how could the leaders of a country drive their people into a war they couldn't win.