Kursk
The German View
-
- $26.99
-
- $26.99
Publisher Description
The battle of Kursk, fought in the summer of 1943, involved six thousand German and Soviet armored vehicles, making it the biggest tank battle of all time and possibly the largest battle of any kind. Students of military history have long recognized the importance of Kursk, also known as "Operation Citadel," and there have been several serious studies of the battle. Yet, the German view of the battle has been largely ignored.After the war, U.S. Army Intelligence officers gathered German commanders' post-war reports of the battle. Due, in part, to poor translations done after the war, these important documents have been overlooked by World War II historians. Steven H. Newton has collected, translated, and edited these accounts, including reports made by the Chiefs of Staff of Army Group South and the Fourth Panzer Army, and by the Army Group Center Operations Officer. As a result, a new and unprecedented picture of German strategy and operations is made available. The translated staff reports are supplemented by Newton's commentary and original research, which challenges a number of widely accepted ideas about this pivotal battle.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
This compilation of German material on the Battle of Kursk (1943) is about as user-friendly as a Tiger tank, but just as indispensable in the right place. Newton has assembled a variety of primary source material from high-ranking German participants either not previously available in English or found only in translations of dubious value. The first part of the book goes to a new translation of a study of Operation Citadel (the great tank battle of Kursk) edited by General Theodor Busse, which offers the perspectives of key tank, infantry, and air commanders. The rest is devoted to essays, mostly by corps commanders facing the Soviet offensive that followed the German defeat at Kursk, but with one perceptive set of comments by a senior railroad officer who throws light on the role (and limitations) of the Soviet partisans in the general logistical nightmare that was the Eastern Front. Both the introduction and the conclusionary third section, which Newton pens, add insightful editorial comments with a tendency to debunk the German myths of"we almost won," and support the characterization of Kursk as a battle the Germans should not have fought because they could not have won it at an acceptable cost. Largely inaccessible to the beginning student of the decisive campaign of World War II, the book may be hailed as invaluable by the serious one. 4 maps and 20 b&w photos not seen by PW.
