Modeling Strategic Behavior

This book provides a graduate level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know. These tools play a critical role in economic research.
Contents:Normal and Extensive Form GamesA First Look at EquilibriumGames with NatureNash Equilibrium: Existence and FoundationsNash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic GamesSignalingRepeated GamesTopics in Dynamic GamesBargainingIntroduction to Mechanism DesignDominant Strategy Mechanism DesignBayesian Mechanism DesignPrincipal AgencyAppendices
Readership: Graduate and doctoral students interested in microeconomics, game theory, and mechanism design. Game Theory;Microeconomics;Mathematical Economics;Econometrics;Mechanism Design;Nash Equilibrium;Dynamic Games0Key Features:This book is based on the lecture notes of the first-year graduate course on game theory and mechanism design taught at the Economics Department, University of Pennsylvania, for many years by George J Mailath