On a Knife Edge
How Germany Lost the First World War
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٥٫٠ - ١ تقييم
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- 159٫99 US$
وصف الناشر
Was the outcome of the First World War on a knife edge? In this major new account of German wartime politics and strategy Holger Afflerbach argues that the outcome of the war was actually in the balance until relatively late in the war. Using new evidence from diaries, letters and memoirs, he fundamentally revises our understanding of German strategy from the decision to go to war and the failure of the western offensive to the radicalisation of Germany's war effort under Hindenburg and Ludendorff and the ultimate collapse of the Central Powers. He uncovers the struggles in wartime Germany between supporters of peace and hardliners who wanted to fight to the finish. He suggests that Germany was not nearly as committed to all-out conquest as previous accounts argue. Numerous German peace advances could have offered the opportunity to end the war before it dragged Europe into the abyss.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
University of Leeds historian Afflerbach (How Fighting Ends) delivers a thorough reassessment of Germany's role in WWI. He contends that German leaders' rigid adherence to the Schlieffen Plan backfired when the 1914 invasion of Belgium sparked international outrage and Great Britain's entrance into the fray, though the successes of German forces on the Western Front and the country's deeply held belief in the superiority of its troops led to overconfidence. After Russia's stunning victory at the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914, tensions increased between Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn, who urged political leaders to seek a negotiated peace with France and Russia as the war became entrenched in the west, and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff, who ultimately succeeded in radicalizing Germany's military strategy, giving the impression of "feral militarism" to those both inside and outside the country. Peace prospects dimmed fatally with the entrances of Italy and Romania into the conflict in 1915 and 1916, respectively, according to Afflerbach, who argues that the Allies "bore a great deal of the responsibility for long duration." Though the book's granular specificity can be heavy-going at times, Afflerbach convincingly shows that Germany's fate was not inevitable. WWI scholars and enthusiasts will relish this exhaustive deep dive.
