On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003-January 2005

On Point II is a comprehensive study of the US Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) from May 2003 to January 2005. Based on primary sources including hundreds of interviews with participants, the study examines how after May 2003 American Soldiers made the transition to a new type of campaign that featured information operations, intelligence, reconstruction, and governance rather than conventional combat. On Point II documents the US Army’s execution of Full Spectrum Operations in the early stages of this conflict. Praise for the Print edition: Sunday, June 29,2008 New York Times article "Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History " by Michael R. Gordon Excerpt:       "The story of the American occupation of Iraq has been the subject of numerous books, studies and memoirs. But now the Army has waded into the highly charged debate with its own nearly 700-page account: "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign."      The unclassified study, the second volume in a continuing history of the Iraq conflict, is as noteworthy for who prepared it as for what it says.  In essence, the study is an attempt by the Army to tell the story of one of the most contentious periods in its history to military experts --and to itself."   ==================================================================================================================== Sunday, June 29, 2008 Washington Post article, "Army's History of Iraq After Hussein Faults Pentagon" by Josh White Excerpt:      "The study, "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, " is an unclassified and unhindered look at U.S. Army operations in Iraq from May 2003 to January 2005.  That critical era of the war has drawn widespread criticism because of a failure to anticipate the the rise of an Iraqi insurgency and because policymakers provided too few U.S. troops and no stratetgy to maintain order after Iraq's decades-old regime was overthrown.        Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese, who authored the report along with the Army's Contemporary Operations Study Team, conclude that U.S. commanders and civillian leaders were too focused on only the military victory and lacked a realistic vision of what Iraq would look like following that triumph."