Posterior Analytics (Bouchier‪)‬

Posterior Analytics (Bouchier)

Aristotle, Aristotle (Greek: Ἀριστοτέλης Aristotélēs) (384 BC – 322 BC) was a Greek philosopher, a student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. He wrote on many subjects, including physics, metaphysics, poetry, theater, music, logic, rhetoric, politics, government, ethics, biology and zoology (384 BCE-322 BCE)


This ebook presents «Posterior Analytics (Bouchier)», from Aristotle. A dynamic table of contents enables to jump directly to the chapter selected.


Table of Contents

- About This Book

- Book I. Posterior Analytics

- Chapter I. Whether A Demonstrative Science Exists

- Chapter Ii. What Knowing Is, What Demonstration Is, And Of What It Consists

- Chapter Iii. A Refutation Of The Error Into Which Some Have Fallen Concerning Science And Demonstration

- Chapter Iv. The Meaning Of ‘distributive,' ‘essential,' ‘universal'

- Chapter V. From What Causes Mistakes Arise With Regard To The Discovery Of The Universal

- Chapter Vi. Demonstration Is Founded On Necessary And Essential Principles

- Chapter Vii. The Premises And The Conclusion Of A Demonstration Must Belong To The Same Genus

- Chapter Viii. Demonstration Is Concerned Only With What Is Eternal

- Chapter Ix. Demonstration Is Founded Not On General, But On Special And Indemonstrable Principles

- Chapter X. The Definition And Division Of Principles

- Chapter Xi. On Certain Principles Which Are Common To All Sciences

- Chapter Xii. On Questions, And, In Passing, On The Way In Which Sciences Are Extended

- Chapter Xiii. The Difference Between The Demonstration And Science Of A Thing's Nature And Those Of Its Cause

- Chapter Xiv. The Figure Proper To Demonstrate Syllogism

- Chapter Xv. On Immediate Negative Propositions

- Chapter Xvi. On Ignorance Resulting From A Defective Arrangement Of Terms In Mediate Propositions

- Chapter Xvii. On Ignorance Resulting From A Defective Arrangement Of Terms In Immediate Propositions

- Chapter Xviii. On Ignorance As Resulting From Defective Sense Perception

- Chapter Xix. Whether The Principles Of Demonstration Are Finite Or Infinite

- Chapter Xx. Middle Terms Are Not Infinite

- Chapter Xxi. In Negations Some Final And Ultimate Point Is Reached Where The Series Must Cease

- Chapter Xxii. In Affirmations Some Final And Ultimate Point Is Reached Where The Series Must Cease

- Chapter Xxiii. Certain Corollaries

- Chapter Xxiv. Whether Universal Or Particular Demonstration Is Superior

- Chapter Xxv. That Affirmative Is Superior To Negative Demonstration

- Chapter Xxvi. Direct Demonstration Is Superior To Reduction Per Impossible

- Chapter Xxvii. What Science Is More Certain And Prior, And What Less Certain And Inferior

- Chapter Xxviii. What Constitutes One Or Many Sciences

- Chapter Xxix. Concerning Many Demonstrations Of The Same Thing

- Chapter Xxx. On Fortuitous Occurrences

- Chapter Xxxi. Sense Perception Cannot Give Demonstrative Science

- Chapter Xxxii. On The Difference Of Principles Corresponding To The Difference Of Syllogisms

- Chapter Xxxiii. The Distinction Between Science And Opinion

- Chapter Xxxiv. On Sagacity

- Book Ii. Posterior Analytics

- Chapter I. On The Number And Arrangements Of Questions

- Chapter Ii. Every Question Is Concerned With The Discovery Of A Middle Term

- Chapter Iii. The Distinction Between Definition And Demonstration

- Chapter Iv. The Essence Of A Thing Cannot Be Attained By Syllogism

- Chapter V. Knowledge Of The Essence Cannot Be Attained By Division

- Chapter Vi. The Essence Cannot Be Proved By The Definition Of The Thing Itself Or By That Of Its Opposite

- Chapter Vii. Whether The Essence Can In Any Way Be Proved

- Chapter Viii. How The Essence Can Be Proved

- Chapter Ix. What Essences Can And What Cannot Be Proved

- Chapter X. The Nature And Forms Of Definition

- Chapter Xi. The Kinds Of Causes Used In Demonstration

- Chapter Xii. On The Causes Of Events Which Exist, Are In Process, Have Happened, Or Will Happen

- Chapter Xiii. On The Search For A Definition

- Chapter Xiv. On The Discovery Of Questions For Demonstration

- Chapter Xv. How Far The Same Middle Term Is Employed For Demonstrating Different Questions

- Chapter Xvi. On Inferring The Cause From The Effect

- Chapter Xvii. Whether There Can Be Several Causes Of The Same Thing

- Chapter Xviii. Which Is The Prior Cause, That Which Is Nearer The Particular, Or The More Universal

- Chapter Xix. On The Attainment Of Primary Principles

- Appendix