Self-Storage Real Estate
A Practitioner's Guide to Street Rate, In-Place Rate, Length of Stay and the Rent Roll That Has No Leases
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- $12.99
Publisher Description
Every other asset class in real estate hands you a lease. An office building hands you twenty of them, each with a term, a rent and a break. A self-storage store hands you nothing: 470 monthly licences, terminable at short notice, signed on a tablet at a trade counter by people moving house. There is no term to discount and no covenant to analyse.
So the rent roll cannot be read. It has to be built — from cohorts of arrivals decaying against a hazard of departure, each cohort carrying the price increases it has received since it walked in. Do that, and the store looks nothing like the pack. The price on the website is £32.65/sq ft. The rent roll collects £35.93/sq ft, 10.0 per cent more. On the promotional rate a customer walking in today actually pays, the gap is 104.4 per cent.
This book underwrites one store completely: 590 units across six sizes in Manchester, 50,000 sq ft of gross internal area, offered at £8.4 million on a 6.05 per cent yield. It prices what an operator's pack leaves out. Reset every customer to the website rate and net operating income falls £90,250 — capitalised, £1.5 million, or 17.7 per cent of the asking price; give up the increase policy altogether and it is £2.3 million, or 27.7 per cent. That portion is not land, not structure, not consent; it is the accumulated output of a pricing discipline, and it unwinds at the rate customers leave if the discipline stops.
Length of stay is the asset. Here it is 13.8 months, and almost every other number is a function of it: what a customer is worth (£2,188), what one costs to acquire (£267), and what the store spends each year simply to replace the customers it loses — £109,074, or 11.0 per cent of the rent roll. That is the recurring cost of an income with no contract behind it, and it appears in no yield.
It works through the decision the sector turns on and rarely computes: how far to push the increases before the churn they cause outruns the revenue they raise. The answer depends on a response curve nobody publishes, so the book gives the range rather than a number — 10.1 per cent to 17.4 per cent across plausible beliefs — and says which part survives the ignorance. The magnitude does not. The direction does: under every belief tested, this store is pushing too gently.
Then the valuation. Three denominators give revenue per square foot of £21.92/sq ft, £31.63/sq ft or £39.73/sq ft on the same building in the same month. The quoted 6.05 per cent yield becomes 5.46 per cent once the capital cycle is paid for. Break-even occupancy is 36.3 per cent, and a new store spends 2.1 years below it. A lender advances 37.6 per cent of the price, constrained by interest cover rather than loan-to-value, and the leverage is negative: 3.34 per cent geared against 5.13 per cent ungeared. 56.9 per cent of the value is the exit yield somebody else applies in year ten.
Written for acquisitions and asset management teams, operators negotiating management contracts, lenders sizing against a rent roll that hundreds of people can cancel, valuers, developers deciding whether the fifth store in a catchment is a store or a mistake, and anyone handed a pack whose headline number is an occupancy rate.
Four Excel workbooks accompany the book, with no sign-up. Every figure the book prints is reproduced by a live formula, and the model workbook ends with a sheet comparing the two line by line.
About this edition: the text of this book was generated with AI (Claude) and published by the author.