Strickland Et Al. v. Newton County Et Al

This is the third in a series of cases involving the local option sales tax, Ga. L. 1975, p. 984 et seq. (Code Ann. § 91-3447a.1). Martin v. Ellis, 242 Ga. 340 (249 S.E.2d 23) (1978); City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358 (254 S.E.2d 315) (1979). In Mangelly, we held that this tax was a county levy and that the cities were not entitled to any of the funds generated by the tax. We also held that the entire Act was unconstitutional. The questions here involve the disbursement of funds collected by the Revenue Commissioner under the Act, but not yet distributed, when the Act was held unconstitutional in Mangelly. The trial court ordered the commissioner to pay the money to the counties. He and the cities appeal. The counties, in Case No. 35159, seek a judgment against the cities for the taxes disbursed to them under this court's supersedeas of the trial court's temporary injunctions. 1. We hold that the Mangelly decision is prospective from March 31, 1979, at 12:00 midnight, when the order of this court was made the judgment of the trial court. The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute is wholly void and of no force and effect from the date it was enacted. This harsh rule is subject to exceptions, however, where, because of the nature of the statute and its previous application, unjust results would accrue to those who justifiably relied on it. Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199 (223 S.E.2d 445) (1976); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). Under these considerations, when a court decides that one of its rulings shall operate prospectively, it is subject to no set principles, but may choose any relevant date in the interest of Justice. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Compare Radford v. State, 238 Ga. 532 (233 S.E.2d 785) (1977) (making State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 (222 S.E.2d 354) (1976), prospective from the date the motion for rehearing was denied). We here choose the date the superior court entered its final judgment because of the administrative difficulties in identifying and refunding the taxes collected in the three day period between the date the rehearing was denied and the date the final judgment was entered.