Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2) Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2)

Tax Elections & Private Bargaining (Part 2‪)‬

Virginia Tax Review 2011, Summer, 31, 1

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Publisher Description

IV. Designing the Election Parameters To Facilitate Tax Bargaining Given the possible welfare, distributional, and administrative consequences of the parameters of tax elections, policymakers should take care in the design of those parameters. The key parameters that set the stage for the private bargaining arc (1) the determination of which party or parties has the power to opt out of the default rule, and (2) the choice of default rule: (140)

GENRE
Business & Personal Finance
RELEASED
2011
June 22
LANGUAGE
EN
English
LENGTH
103
Pages
PUBLISHER
Virginia Tax Review
SELLER
The Gale Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation and an affiliate of Cengage Learning, Inc.
SIZE
378.7
KB

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