The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science
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4.2 • 13 Ratings
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- $14.99
Publisher Description
A paradigm-shifting, widely acclaimed work for our generation, The Knowledge Machine revolutionizes our understanding of the origins and structure of science.
Michael Strevens’s “provocative and fascinating” (Jennifer Szalai, New York Times) investigation of science asks two fundamental questions: Why is science so powerful? And why did it take so long for the human race to start using science to learn the secrets of nature? The Knowledge Machine’s radical answer is that science, by nature, calls on its practitioners to do the irrational. By willfully ignoring religion, theoretical beauty, and especially philosophy, scientists embrace an unnaturally narrow method of inquiry, channeling unprecedented energy into observation and experimentation. Rich with vivid historical examples and widely acclaimed, Knowledge Machine overturns many of our most basic assumptions about scientific discovery.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Strevens (Thinking Off Your Feet), an NYU philosophy professor, takes a scholarly look at how modern science arose with this erudite study. He begins by examining impactful explanations for the scientific method's success, chiefly Karl Popper's position that science is defined by a rigorous commitment to finding evidence opposed to, as well as in support of, one's own theories, and Thomas Kuhn's idea of scientific paradigms, or culturally dominant theories which scientists gain intellectual clout by subscribing to. After pointing out these arguments' flaws, he outlines his own "Iron Rule of Explanation," which sees "empirical testing" as science's defining principle. While modern scientists are still susceptible to error and bias, Strevens writes, the iron rule sets hard data as the foundation of their theories, and this sets their work apart from the ancient and middle ages' often quite ingenious but less practically useful natural philosophy. Strevens supports his arguments with historical examples, like Arthur Eddington's 1919 eclipse viewing intended to substantiate Einstein's theory of general relativity; he notes that Eddington took great care in the collection of data, but not, contrary to Popper, in considering contradictory or ambiguous evidence, nor, contrary to Kuhn, in adhering to previously established scientific consensus. For readers curious about why science works as well as it does, Strevens provides a convincing answer.
Customer Reviews
Nailed it
Really well done. It takes a lot of chutzpah to challenge Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, the reigning theorists of how science works, but the author manages to do it and come out on top, in my view. I think this really is how science works (and I’m a scientist). In fact I think I’ll use it in a seminar I teach. What I liked most was how he situated his thesis in a solid understanding of science, history, and the history of science, with clearly explained examples of scientists who compartmentalized their scientific pursuits from their other pursuits in philosophy, theology, etc. It’s funny: I feel every scientist ought to know this history, for the purpose of achieving well-roundedness, but at the same time, the book asserts that the science they do will be just fine even if they are totally ignorant of that history. I think that’s probably correct, so I highly recommend this book, not for improved science, but for enjoyment. I do wish the author might have addressed what I consider to be a building crisis: the divergence between the accumulation of knowledge by the knowledge machine about what “is” in the natural world, and the increasing confusion about values, and what we “ought” to do with this knowledge. Maybe it’s for the best that this book didn’t wade too deeply into the is/ought distinction, aside from some brief comments at the end about climate change, etc. But maybe a second book is in order, in which claims are made about what we ought to do with scientific knowledge in a society that can find a COVID vaccine in less than a year, but that may not be able to convince enough of its conspiracy-minded citizens to take it.