The Prometheus Bomb
The Manhattan Project and Government in the Dark
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5.0 • 1 Rating
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- $14.99
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- $14.99
Publisher Description
During World War II, the lives of millions of Americans lay precariously in the hands of a few brilliant scientists who raced to develop the first weapon of mass destruction. Elected officials gave the scientists free rein in the Manhattan Project without understanding the complexities and dangers involved in splitting the atom.
The Manhattan Project was the first example of a new type of choice for congressmen, presidents, and other government officials: life and death on a national scale. From that moment, our government began fashioning public policy for issues of scientific development, discoveries, and inventions that could secure or threaten our existence and our future. But those same men and women had no training in such fields, did not understand the ramifications of the research, and relied on incomplete information to form potentially life-changing decisions.
Through the story of the Manhattan Project, Neil J. Sullivan asks by what criteria the people in charge at the time made such critical decisions. He also ponders how similar judgments are reached today with similar incomprehension from those at the top as our society dives down the potential rabbit hole of bioengineering, nanotechnology, and scientific developments yet to come.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
There are many histories of the atom bomb, but this excellent addition to the literature from Sullivan (Diamond in the Bronx), professor in the School of Public Affairs at Baruch College, tells the story from an unusual angle, pointing out that many of the American leaders who launched the Manhattan Project as a matter of national survival had no understanding of the science involved. The scientists made decisions with potentially catastrophic consequences while assuming, correctly, that their superiors would go along. Politicians made political choices with similar insouciance. Told that the war effort required some patriotic silence about rather large military expenditures, Congress submitted to the demands of the fledgling national security apparatus, beginning a baleful tradition. In deciding not to share details with allies, America offended Britain but not the U.S.S.R., whose spies kept it informed. It's arguable whether any historian can deliver a satisfying explanation for Truman's decision to use the bomb, but Sullivan examines everyone's motives without resorting to hindsight. Readers of Richard Rhodes's classic, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, will not regret reading this parallel history, which passes over Oppenheimer and his brilliant crew in order to emphasize their non-scientist superiors, including Vannevar Bush, Gen. Leslie Groves, and F.D.R. Sullivan shows that the decisions of these powerful men triumphed in the short run but produced dismal long-term consequences that remain with us.
