The Rucksack War The Rucksack War

The Rucksack War

U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983, United States Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983

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Publisher Description

Edgar F. Raines Jr.’s The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983, the second volume in the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s Contingency Operations Series, provides an account of how Army logistics affected ground operations during the Grenada intervention and, in turn, how combat influenced logistical performance. Noteworthy is the emphasis on the role of individuals and the decisions they made based on the necessarily incomplete and sometimes misleading information available at the time during an unexpected and short-notice contingency operation. The narrative ranges from the meetings of the National Security Council, where the president grappled with the question of whether to send in troops, to the jungle environs of Grenada, where a sergeant in combat coped successfully with a Cuban ambush even though he and his men were handicapped by a lack of hand grenades. The considerations that influenced these decisions and others like them are discussed at all three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. Most important, Dr. Raines tells the story of the Army’s operations and its logistical effort in Grenada from the joint perspective. He covers not only planning and decisionmaking by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Atlantic Command, and Joint Special Operations Command but also coordination and communications, or lack thereof, between the service contingents in the area of operations. The result is a fascinating account of a complex event that provides insight into the myriad issues the Army encountered and will continue to face in future contingency operations. Dr. Raines puts forth his conclusions on this brief but important campaign not as authoritative pronouncements but as a springboard for further professional reflection and discussion. Without question, for Army leaders, commanders, and especially logisticians, they offer instructive parallels and trenchant observations pertinent in today’s complicated world. Washington, D.C.

Richard W. STEWART 17 August 2010 xviii The Author Edgar F. Raines Jr. was born in Murphysboro, Illinois, in 1944. He obtained his B.A. and M.A. degrees in history in 1966 and 1968 from Southern Illinois University–Carbondale, where his thesis adviser was Professor John Y. Simon, editor of The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant. Beginning in 1969, he attended the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where he studied with Professor Edward M. Coffman, one of the pioneers of the new military history, and in 1976 received his Ph.D. in history. After working three years as the assistant academic dean at Silver Lake College in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, and fourteen months as a historian at the Office of Air Force History, Dr. Raines joined the U.S. Army Center of Military History in November 1980. He coauthored (with Maj. David R. Campbell) The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942–1985 (1986) and authored Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II (2000). Dr. Raines has written not only numerous unpublished special studies but also several articles in military and social history. In 1985 his “The Ku Klux Klan in Illinois, 1867–1875” won the Harry E. Pratt Award for the best article in Illinois History, and in 2003 his “Disaster Off Casablanca: Air Observation Posts in Operation Torch and the Role of Failure in Institutional Innovation” won the Army Historical Foundation Award for the best academic article on the history of the U.S. Army.

Republished by Liber Copia LLC for convenient study and reference on any device.

GENRE
History
RELEASED
1983
January 1
LANGUAGE
EN
English
LENGTH
686
Pages
PUBLISHER
Liber Copia LLC
SELLER
Moran Matan
SIZE
21.3
MB