The list had already been in existence. The International Atomic Energy Agency had previously developed a list of inventories associated with the development and production of nuclear weapons – this is known as INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a.
The INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a list of inventories was intended as a caution against distribution of assets noted in the document – especially distribution to countries supporting international terrorist groups, or having been noted as attempting to develop nuclear weapons capacity.
Of course the list wasn't ignored; naturally it is put to good use as the definitive model template from which Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons associated assets are to be expedited by the United Nations.
Security Council Resolution 2231 (which includes the JCPOA) documents the official United Nations procedure for how Iranian access to nuclear weapons associated inventories is to be facilitated.
The text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action details how much of the plot is to be carried out – and ongoing Security Council Progress Reports on the project keep us informed, at six-month intervals, of the continuing success of the ongoing undertaking.
This writing confirms all that. And explains in further clarifying detail how the activity, functionally, is carried out.
The text of the JCPOA underplays that the International Atomic Energy Agency is prevented, under the plan, from verifying that the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a listed inventory packages procured by Iran under United Nations sponsorship are not being diverted for use in nuclear weapons development and, or manufacture.
This writing, however, explains how the Security Council's Resolution 2231; Annex A:JCPOA plan prevents IAEA the verification measures required by treaty – and confirms, from IAEA Board of Governors Reports, that inspections of Iranian procured inventories are not being performed, have never been performed.
The source documentation provided in this book is not classified – it is there for any Citizen to review.
Nevertheless, U.S. politicians aren't talking about it too much – in any kind of an honest manner; that is; this regardless of what facts are publicly announced by the United Nations Security Council.
This short writing doesn't address the ongoing promotional political mythology and prevarication surrounding the issue; my other books do that.
The objective of this writing is to present the documented mechanics of how the policy of facilitating arms acquisitions is being carried out.